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Abstract 
 
This study examines the effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting behavior prior 
to seasoned equity offerings (SEO). While SEO firms have strong incentives to convey 
optimistic information to boost the pre-SEO stock price, they also face enhanced litigation risk 
arising from SEO-related regulations.  Thus, I hypothesize that managers of SEO firms will 
release optimistic forecasts prior to an SEO only if they have the accounting flexibility to 
manage subsequent reported earnings to meet or exceed their forecasts.  I find that managers 
with greater accounting flexibility are more likely to issue a forecast prior to the SEO and their 
forecasts are more optimistic and more specific.  Further, I find that accounting flexibility has no 
effect on managers’ forecasting behavior either for non-SEO control firms or for non-SEO 
periods.  My results suggest that, when managers face a tension between incentives to report 
optimistically and high litigation risk, accounting flexibility is an important factor that 
determines their forecasting behavior.   
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1. Introduction  
This study examines the effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting behavior prior 
to seasoned equity offerings (SEO).  Prior studies predict that firms that plan to raise capital 
through SEOs have an incentive to increase their voluntary disclosures to reduce information 
asymmetry and/or to provide optimistic information in order to lower their cost of equity and 
boost the stock price (e.g., Frankel et al., 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; and Jo and Kim, 
2007).  However, a competing factor that dampens the incentive for voluntary disclosure is the 
increased threat of litigation around equity offerings due to the provisions of Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, in addition to the general provisions of Section 10b-5 of the 1934 Act.1  
In view of the high litigation risk, managers would voluntarily disclose optimistic information 
prior to an SEO only if they can subsequently issue earnings reports that deliver their 
expectations.  One way of achieving this is to manage subsequent reported earnings to make up 
any shortfall relative to their forecasts (see Kasznik, 1999).  In this paper, I hypothesize that 
managers of SEO firms would be more likely to make voluntary disclosures and issue optimistic 
forecasts when they have sufficient accounting flexibility to achieve realized earnings that meet 
or beat their forecasts.  
The literature on SEOs examines whether managers’ voluntary disclosures and earnings 
management behavior around SEOs reflect attempts to increase the proceeds from equity 
offerings.  Frankel et al. (1995) show that, relative to other firms, firms that frequently access 
equity and debt markets have a higher tendency to issue management forecasts; however, these 
                                                 
1 Firms with equity offerings face additional threat of litigation under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.  
Unlike Section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in lawsuits brought under Section 11, plaintiffs do not 
have to prove that they relied on false or misleading information provided by the offering firms.  In fact, a decline in 
stock price between the offering date and the lawsuit date can be taken as initial evidence of damage and the 
defendant firms have the burden to prove that other factors contributed to the stock price decline.  In addition, 
Section 5(c) of the 1933 Securities Act, so called “gun-jumping” law, regulates SEO firms’ disclosure activity for 
the purpose of preventing any attempt to “condition the market” prior to the equity offering regardless of the intent 
of such disclosures. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754592
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firms are not more likely to forecast just before an offering.  Similarly, Lang and Lundholm 
(2000) find no change in the frequency of management forecasts over a period of six months 
preceding an SEO.  These results suggest that, on average, incentives to disclose additional 
information prior to an SEO are overshadowed by the threat of litigation faced by these firms. 
On the other hand, Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that SEO firms that issue 
management forecasts earn higher pre-announcement returns, suggesting that the disclosure 
activity may have been efforts to “hype” the stock to obtain high valuations from investors.  In 
contrast, Frankel et al. (1995) show that management forecasts prior to SEOs are not 
systematically higher than analysts’ existing expectations, implying that legal liability in fact 
effectively deters overly optimistic forecasts.  I argue that managers would be likely to issue 
optimistic forecasts even in the face of litigation risk, if they believe they could achieve 
subsequent earnings that will meet or exceed their forecasts.2  Managers’ ability to meet or beat 
their forecasts can be enhanced if they have the accounting flexibility to manage earnings by 
inflating accruals.  Hence, I hypothesize that managers of firms with greater accounting 
flexibility for managing earnings would be more likely to issue forecasts and to issue more 
optimistic forecasts compared to the prevailing analysts’ consensus prior to an SEO. 
By accounting flexibility, I mean the extent to which managers can manage reported 
earnings to achieve a desired level of earnings.  Barton and Simko (2002) argue that due to the 
articulation between the income statement and the balance sheet, upward earnings management 
in previous periods would be partly reflected in a high level of net operating assets on the 
balance sheet, constraining managers’ ability to optimistically bias the reported earnings of the 
current period.  These authors show that the beginning balance of net operating assets scaled by 
                                                 
2 In fact, prior evidence shows that firms increase their reported earnings by using discretionary accruals around 
SEOs either to temporarily increase stock prices (Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998) or to maintain prior 
overvaluation (Chen et al., 2009). 
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sales (NOA), a proxy for the accumulation of managers’ previous earnings management efforts, 
is negatively related to the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst consensus forecasts.  Based 
on Barton and Simko (2002), I measure accounting flexibility available for earnings management 
by the negative of NOA.3  Furthermore, in order to focus on firm-specific accounting choice and 
to control for industry effects, I use the industry-adjusted variable as an empirical measure of 
accounting flexibility.4   
To examine the effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting behavior prior to 
the announcement of SEOs, this study specifically considers three aspects of management 
earnings forecasts: (i) issuance, (ii) news content, and (iii) specificity (e.g., point or range).  For 
my empirical tests, I collect a sample of 480 SEO firms from 1997 to 2005, along with a size and 
industry-matched control sample of non-SEO firms.  I use the matched control sample design to 
test whether the hypothesized effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting behavior 
is more prevalent in SEO firms given their incentive structure.   
Note that managers in general (i.e., not only those with an imminent SEO) could utilize 
accounting flexibility in their forecasting behavior.  Managers may try to benefit from a boost in 
their stock price by issuing an overly optimistic forecast for reasons other than equity offerings, 
such as stock price-based incentives when compensation and wealth are tied to the firm’s share 
price (Nagar et al., 2003) or insider trading incentives (Noe, 1999; and Cheng and Lo, 2006).  
                                                 
3  Accounting flexibility can also be interpreted as the extent to which net assets on the balance sheet are 
conservatively stated; that is, the negative of NOA captures the degree of understatement in net asset values due to 
conservative accounting.  To the extent that more conservatively stated balance sheets can provide managers with 
greater opportunity to manage reported earnings toward a benchmark, this variable captures firms’ accounting 
flexibility for earnings management.  
 
4 Similar to Barton and Simko (2002), I measure the size of net operating assets by normalizing them with respect to 
sales, i.e., I use the inverse of the net operating asset turnover to reflect higher or lower accumulation of net 
operating assets relative to the normal level required to achieve reported sales.  Since there are likely to be 
systematic differences in NOA across industries that are unrelated to over- or under-statement of net assets, I control 
for industry effects as recommended by DeFond (2002). 
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While prior studies do not consider accounting flexibility in examining the effect of these 
incentives on management forecasts, such incentives could lead to managers being more likely to 
issue a forecast and to issue more optimistic forecasts when they have greater accounting 
flexibility even in non-SEO periods.  Given this possibility, I examine managers’ forecasting 
behavior for both SEO firms and matched non-SEO firms in the main analysis.  However, since 
SEO firms face a tension between strong incentives to boost stock price and high litigation risk, I 
expect that accounting flexibility has a stronger effect on managers’ forecasting behavior for 
SEO firms relative to non-SEO firms.5   
The empirical results show that accounting flexibility has an impact on managers’ 
forecasting decisions.  First, I find evidence that accounting flexibility is significantly positively 
related to the probability of issuing management forecasts over a nine-month period prior to the 
SEO announcement.  Moreover, this relation is significant for the SEO firms, but not for the non-
SEO firms.  This implies that, given the strong incentive to maximize the offering proceeds, 
managers of SEO firms appear to take into account their ability to manage subsequent reported 
earnings when making their forecast issuance decisions.    
Second, I provide evidence that managers with higher accounting flexibility issue more 
optimistic forecasts relative to the analyst consensus prior to the SEO.  Thus, while Frankel et al. 
(1995) find no optimism in management forecasts for their overall sample of public offerings, I 
find that managers of SEO firms do issue optimistic forecasts when they have the ability to 
manage subsequent earnings if they fall short of their forecasts.  In contrast, I find no significant 
effect of accounting flexibility on the news content of management forecasts for non-SEO firms, 
consistent with weaker incentives relative to SEO firms.   
                                                 
5  Consistent with my expectation, Kasznik (1999) suggests that, in general, managers of firms with greater 
accounting flexibility may not need to release earnings forecasts, since they can still achieve their earnings targets 
by using their accounting flexibility and at the same time avoid legal costs associated with forecast errors. 
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Third, I show that accounting flexibility is positively related to the specificity of 
management forecasts.  Given the findings of Baginski et al. (1993) and Baginski et al. (2007) 
that more specific management forecasts are associated with greater price reaction and analyst 
forecast revisions, this result suggests that managers with higher accounting flexibility choose 
more specific forecasts to obtain a favorable market valuation prior to an SEO.6   
To better control for differential incentives to boost stock prices, I also use the SEO firm 
as its own control.  I compare SEO firms’ management forecasts issued during the nine-month 
period preceding the SEO announcement with forecasts issued during the corresponding nine-
month period in the year prior to the SEO year.  Consistent with my results using the matched 
control-firm approach, I also observe that the effect of accounting flexibility on the issuance, 
news content, and specificity of management forecasts is significantly more pronounced just 
prior to the SEO relative to the pre-SEO year.  
This paper contributes to the accounting literature in several ways.  First, this study 
provides evidence that accounting flexibility, by facilitating earnings management, serves as an 
important determinant of managers’ forecasting behavior.  My findings complement the results 
of Kasznik (1999) which suggest that, once managers issue optimistic forecasts, they manage 
reported earnings toward their forecasts to lower forecast errors.  My results suggest that 
managers issue optimistic forecasts when they have a strong incentive to provide good news and, 
in addition, have the ability to manage reported earnings to avoid costly litigation.  Second, this 
paper adds to the literature on voluntary disclosures around SEOs.  While Frankel et al. (1995) 
find that on average managers do not issue optimistic forecasts prior to external financing events 
possibly because of greater legal liability, my work provides new evidence that managers of SEO 
                                                 
6 All of the above results are robust to (a) using a rank variable of accounting flexibility, and (b) examining the 
current and non-current components of accounting flexibility separately. 
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firms do issue optimistic forecasts if they have the accounting flexibility to manage earnings.  
Third, this paper also provides evidence on the role of accounting flexibility as a determinant of 
the specificity of management forecasts.  While previous studies on management forecasts have 
focused on the issuance decision, my paper responds to the call for a better understanding of the 
determinants of forecast characteristics, one of which is the specificity of forecasts (Baginski et 
al., 2004; Hirst et al., 2008).  
The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews relevant previous studies 
and develops the hypotheses.  Section 3 provides details of the research design.  Section 4 shows 
the results of empirical tests.  Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the findings and 
discussing limitations and future research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Accounting Flexibility and Issuance of Management Forecasts Prior to SEOs 
 This paper is related to studies of voluntary disclosure and earnings management in the 
SEO setting.  Previous studies document that SEO firms tend to provide more voluntary 
disclosures in general in order to achieve a lower cost of capital.  Frankel et al. (1995) show that, 
relative to firms with no external financing, firms that raise external capital from debt and equity 
markets provide management forecasts more frequently in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and lower their cost of capital.  However, these authors do not find any evidence of 
an increase in the frequency of management forecasts prior to the offering, in particular, over the 
nine-month pre-offering period, most likely due to increased legal liability exposure.7  Therefore, 
while these firms in general issue management forecasts more frequently, the enhanced threat of 
                                                 
7 Frankel et al. (1995) choose the nine-month pre-offering period as the event window, since it is close enough to the 
offering so that management forecasts issued in the event window can affect investors’ information available at the 
offering date, but not so close as to overlap with the “quiet period” when disclosure activity is not allowed. 
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litigation due to securities laws related to public offerings seems to dampen their incentive to 
temporarily increase voluntary disclosures just before the offering.  
While Frankel et al. (1995) examine frequent issuers of debt and equity, the subsequent 
studies focus only on seasoned equity offerings.  Marquardt and Wiedman (1998) find that, when 
managers sell their own stock in a secondary offering, they are more likely to issue forecasts 
prior to the offering announcement with a view to maximizing the proceeds from the sale of their 
shares.  In addition, using a broader measure of voluntary disclosure based on details of press 
releases, Lang and Lundholm (2000) and Jo and Kim (2007) show that firms do increase their 
voluntary disclosures in general (i.e., all disclosures excluding management forecasts) prior to an 
SEO to obtain favorable valuations from investors.  Lang and Lundholm (2000) also find that 
SEO firms that issue a greater number of management forecasts earn higher pre-announcement 
returns but experience larger price declines at the announcement of the SEO, suggesting that the 
disclosure activity may have been used to “hype” the stock.   
Collectively, prior studies suggest that SEO firms have a strong incentive to provide 
voluntary disclosures to obtain higher stock valuations prior to SEOs.  While some SEO firms 
temporarily increase their overall voluntary disclosure activity as an attempt to “hype” the stock, 
there is no evidence that SEO firms on average increase the frequency of management forecasts 
since they are subject to a higher level of litigation risk associated with equity offerings.  
However, these studies do not take into account reporting flexibility that could play a role in 
managers’ forecasting decisions.  Even in the face of litigation threat, managers of SEO firms 
would be likely to issue forecasts if they believed that they could deliver subsequent earnings 
that would meet or exceed their forecasts.  In turn, managers’ ability to meet or beat their 
forecasts can be enhanced if they have more accounting flexibility to manage reported earnings 
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toward their forecasts.  Therefore, I argue that, given the tension between a strong incentive to 
provide voluntary disclosure for favorable stock valuation and the high level of SEO-related 
litigation risk, accounting flexibility can influence managers’ forecast behavior by facilitating 
future earnings management.8  While previous results suggest that, on average, the incentive to 
disclose additional information before equity offerings is overshadowed by the threat of litigation, 
I predict that managers of firms with greater accounting flexibility would be more likely to issue 
forecasts prior to an SEO.  Thus, my first hypothesis is stated in alternative form as follows. 
H1: Controlling for other factors, managers with greater accounting flexibility are more likely to 
issue earnings forecasts prior to an SEO announcement.  
 It should be noted that the effect of accounting flexibility on the forecast issuance 
decision is not necessarily limited to the period just prior to an SEO announcement.  It is also 
conceivable that managers would consider the accounting flexibility available for earnings 
management for their forecast decisions even under general circumstances.  In other words, even 
in the absence of an imminent equity offering, managers can benefit from a boost in stock price 
by issuing an earnings forecast and later reporting earnings that meet or beat the forecast when 
they have greater accounting flexibility.  Furthermore, previous studies suggest that other 
incentives such as stock price-based incentives (Nagar et al., 2003) or insider trading incentives 
(Noe, 1999; and Cheng and Lo, 2006) affect management forecasts.  While these studies do not 
consider accounting flexibility in examining the effect of these incentives on management 
forecasts, such incentives could lead to a higher likelihood of managers issuing forecasts even in 
non-SEO periods when they have greater accounting flexibility.  Given such a possibility, I 
examine whether accounting flexibility has a stronger effect on managers’ forecasting behavior 
                                                 
8 Kasznik (1999) provides evidence on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and earnings management in 
the general cross-section of firms.  He finds that once managers issue optimistic forecasts, they manage reported 
earnings toward their forecasts as a way of reducing litigation costs associated with ex post inaccurate forecasts. 
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prior to an SEO announcement relative to that under non-SEO circumstances.  
 
2.2 Accounting Flexibility and News Content of Management Forecasts  
 Previous studies on management forecasts provide evidence that the market responds to 
the news conveyed by management forecasts.  Good (bad) news forecasts are found to be 
associated with positive (negative) price reaction, where forecast news is defined relative to the 
prevailing market expectation of future earnings (Patell, 1976; and Penman, 1980).  In addition, 
analysts are found to revise their forecasts consistent with the direction of the news conveyed by 
management forecasts (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Williams, 1996; and Cotter et al., 2006).  
Linking these findings to equity offerings, one would expect managers to be more likely to 
provide a good-news forecast in order to increase stock prices prior to SEO announcements.  
However, prior research does not find such optimism in management forecasts.  Frankel et al. 
(1995) show that management forecasts, issued prior to public offerings, are not systematically 
higher than prevailing analysts’ expectations.  Similarly, Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that, 
while SEO firms release optimistic information in their other disclosures, they do not provide 
more optimistic management forecasts.  Thus, these studies suggest that the higher level of 
litigation risk may effectively dampen firms’ incentives to provide optimistic forecasts prior to 
SEOs, thus leading to no optimism on average.   
I argue that all SEO firms may not be equally restrained by the legal liability constraint.  
Managers of SEO firms can mitigate their litigation concerns through the use of accounting 
flexibility by making their forecasts more accurate ex post via earnings management.  Thus, 
similar to the forecast issuance decision, I expect that managers would be likely to issue more 
optimistic forecasts even in the face of litigation risk if they can meet or beat their forecasts by 
managing earnings.  Thus, 
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H2: Controlling for other factors, managers with greater accounting flexibility are likely to issue 
more optimistic forecasts relative to the analyst consensus prior to the announcement of an SEO.  
Given the possibility that accounting flexibility could affect managers’ forecasting 
behavior for non-SEO firms as well, I compare the two groups in examining news content.  
Although I expect a positive effect of accounting flexibility on management forecast optimism 
for both groups, I predict the effect to be stronger for SEO firms than for non-SEO firms.  
 
2.3 Accounting Flexibility and Specificity of Management Forecasts  
 In practice, managers issue earnings forecasts with various levels of specificity.  Based 
on King et al. (1990), the specificity of forecasts is calibrated as follows: a point forecast (e.g., 
“earnings per share of $1.00”) is most specific and a forecast with a narrower range is more 
specific than one with a wider range.  For example, a forecast of “earnings per share between 
$0.90 and $1.10” is considered as more specific than a forecast of “earnings per share between 
$0.50 and $1.50” even though the two forecasts have the same midpoint of “earnings per share of 
$1.00”.  Open-ended forecasts such as a minimum forecast (e.g., “earnings per share of at least 
$1.00”) or a maximum forecast (e.g., “earnings per share of at most $1.00”) are considered less 
specific than point or range forecasts.  Qualitative statements such as “earnings may not meet 
expectations” are considered to be the least specific forecasts. 
 Previous studies on management forecasts show that a more specific forecast can trigger 
greater stock price reaction and analyst forecast revision for a given level of news conveyed by 
the forecast (Baginski et al., 1993; and Baginski et al., 2007).  These findings are consistent with 
the theoretical prediction that price informativeness of the unexpected portion of a disclosure 
increases with the degree of disclosure precision (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991) and with the 
Bayesian adjustment model’s prediction that the magnitude of belief revision becomes smaller 
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for more uncertain disclosures (Hirst et al., 1999).  These studies suggest that the specificity of 
management forecasts affects the reactions of investors and analysts to the news contained in the 
forecasts and thus managers would strategically choose the level of specificity.  
Thus, I can expect that managers of SEO firms issue more specific forecasts to obtain 
more favorable stock price reactions to their forecasts.  However, a competing factor is a higher 
level of litigation risk associated with more specific forecasts.  This is because the likelihood that 
a more specific forecast is construed as overly optimistic or inaccurate is higher, leading 
investors to sue managers for misleading information.9  Given such a trade-off in issuing more 
specific forecasts, I argue that accounting flexibility would affect the manager’s choice of 
forecast specificity by mitigating the litigation threat related to more specific forecasts.  Thus,  
H3: Controlling for other factors, managers with greater accounting flexibility are likely to issue 
more specific earnings forecasts prior to the announcement of an SEO.  
In testing H3, I examine both SEO and non-SEO firms.  Although I expect managers of 
non-SEO firms with greater accounting flexibility to issue more specific forecasts, I predict the 
effect to be stronger for SEO firms than for non-SEO firms. 
  
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 I obtain a sample of SEO firms from the Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global New 
Issues database over the period from 1997 to 2005.  Following prior studies, I include primary 
and secondary common stock offerings and exclude units and warrant offerings.  The sample is 
limited to U.S. firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.  To be included in the sample,  an 
                                                 
9 Consistent with this concern, King et al. (1990) find that managers issue less specific forecasts when they expect 
the forecast accuracy to be lower. 
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SEO must satisfy the following conditions: 1) the equity offering is made after two years of the 
initial public offering to avoid the confounding effect of IPO performance; 2) only the first 
equity offering is included when a firm has multiple offerings over the sample period; 3) 
offerings made by companies in the utilities industry (SIC 4900 – 4999) and financial industry 
(SIC 6000 – 6999) are excluded due to differences in their regulatory environment and 
accounting methods;  4) the issuing firm has the required financial statement data on Compustat 
and stock price/return data on CRSP; and 5) the issuing firm has a matched non-SEO firm of 
similar size in the same industry.  I obtain management forecast data from First Call, analyst 
coverage from I/B/E/S, and securities class action lawsuit filings to measure the probability of 
litigation from Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.   
 After applying these criteria, I obtain a final sample of 480 SEOs.  Table 1 reports a 
summary of sample characteristics of SEO firms.  Panel A of Table 1 shows that equity offerings 
are not clustered in any year(s) of the sample period.  Panel B of Table 1 reveals that the sample 
of equity offerings is obtained from various industries. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals (14%) 
and electronics (14%) account for a larger portion of the issues relative to other industries.  Panel 
C of Table 1 displays the size and offering characteristics of the SEO sample where size is 
measured at the beginning of the equity offering announcement quarter.  The mean and median 
total assets equal $631 million and $191 million, respectively.  The mean and median market 
capitalization equal $1,070 million and $345 million, respectively.  The mean and median offer 
amounts are $130 million and $73 million, corresponding to 26% and 21% of market value.  The 
mean and median increase in the number of shares outstanding due to equity issues are 21% and 
18%, respectively.  These descriptive statistics are similar to those reported in previous studies of 
SEOs (e.g., Jo and Kim, 2007; and Chen et al., 2009). 
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3.2 Measurement of Variables 
 The main variable of interest in this study is accounting flexibility.  By accounting 
flexibility, I mean the extent to which managers can manage reported earnings toward certain 
benchmarks (e.g., analyst consensus forecast and managers’ own earnings forecast).  Thus, when 
managers have the ability to report earnings that meet or beat their earnings forecasts by inflating 
accruals, I assume that managers have more accounting flexibility.  Consistent with this view, 
Barton and Simko (2002) suggest a method of measuring accounting flexibility.  They argue that 
due to the articulation between the income statement and the balance sheet, upward earnings 
management in the past would be partly reflected in a high level of net operating assets on the 
balance sheet.  In turn, the level of net operating assets will constrain the manager’s ability to 
optimistically bias the current period’s earnings.  They show that the likelihood of meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts is negatively related to the beginning balance of net operating assets 
scaled by sales (NOA).   
Following Barton and Simko (2002), I measure accounting flexibility by the negative of 
NOA.  That is, I measure the size of net operating assets by normalizing them with respect to 
sales, which is the inverse of the net operating assets turnover ratio, to reflect higher or lower 
accumulation of net operating assets relative to the normal level required to achieve reported 
sales.  In addition, I adjust NOA by subtracting the industry median to focus on firm-specific 
accounting choice, as recommended by DeFond (2002).  Since this study examines management 
forecasts issued before SEOs, I use quarterly data to measure accounting flexibility (Flexibility) 
at the beginning of the nine-month period prior to an SEO announcement.  Variable 
measurements are explained in more detail in the appendix.  
I obtain management forecasts from First Call database.  I focus on forecasts issued over 
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a nine-month period prior to the announcement of an SEO, following Frankel et al. (1995) as 
explained earlier.  I only include forecasts relating to reporting periods after the SEO 
announcement, since those are the forecasts that can influence investors’ expectations of future 
earnings and thus the stock valuation prior to the offering.  Using these forecasts, I measure three 
attributes of management forecasts: issuance, news content, and specificity. 
 MF is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the SEO firm issues an earnings 
forecast during the event window and zero otherwise.  To construct variables reflecting news 
content and specificity of management forecasts, I use only point and range forecasts.10  In cases 
of multiple forecasts issued by a firm in the event window, only the last forecast issued before 
the SEO announcement is included because that is the most recent information available to 
investors.  News_MF is a proxy for news conveyed in a management forecast, measured as the 
management forecast less the prevailing median analyst consensus, scaled by stock price.  
Higher values of News_MF imply more optimistic forecasts relative to the analyst consensus.  
Specificity_MF, a proxy for the specificity of a forecast, is set to zero for a point forecast, and, 
for a range forecast, is calculated as the negative of the difference between the upper limit and 
lower limit of the forecast range, divided by stock price.  Accordingly, a greater value of 
Specificity_MF corresponds to a more specific forecast. 
 
3.2.1 Control Variables   
In the empirical tests, I include as control variables other factors that are found by prior 
studies to be related to management forecasts.  Previous research documents several firm 
characteristics as determinants of the issuance of management forecasts.  For example, firm size 
                                                 
10 As shown by previous studies on management forecasts, the other two types of forecasts (open-ended forecasts 
and qualitative statements) account for only a small percentage of management forecasts, and moreover, it is 
difficult to measure the news content and specificity of these types of forecasts  (see Choi et al., 2010).  
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is positively related to the issuance of management forecasts (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; and 
Bamber and Cheon, 1998).  Log_MVE is measured as the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization at the beginning of the SEO announcement quarter.  Following Bamber and Cheon 
(1998), who show that proprietary cost is negatively related to a firm’s voluntary disclosure 
decision, I calculate the industry sales concentration ratio, Ind_Con, as the sales of the top five 
firms in the firm’s industry divided by total industry sales during the quarter preceding the SEO 
announcement.  Since previous studies provide evidence on the effect of litigation risk on 
management forecasts (Francis et al., 1994; Skinner, 1997;  and Field et al., 2005), I include an 
ex ante probability of litigation as a proxy for litigation risk, Lit_Prob, based on the model used 
by Rogers and Stocken (2005).11  
Waymire (1985) and Lundholm (1993) examine the relation between voluntary 
disclosure and the level and variability of firm performance. Although these studies provide 
mixed evidence, I include Sales_Growth and Cum_Ret as measures of firm performance and 
Std_Ret and Vol_Earn as measures of uncertainty.12  Sales_Growth is calculated as sales of 
quarter t divided by sales of quarter t-4 (minus one), where quarter t is the quarter preceding the 
SEO announcement.  Cum_Ret equals cumulative returns and Std_Ret is the standard deviation 
of daily returns over a period of 252 days ending one day before the SEO announcement.  
Vol_Earn, earnings volatility, is measured as the absolute value of seasonally differenced EPS 
scaled by the beginning-of-quarter stock price for the quarter preceding the SEO announcement.   
In addition, I include the market-to-book ratio, MB, measured at the beginning of the 
announcement quarter as a proxy for growth opportunities and information asymmetry.  
                                                 
11 Table A.1 in the appendix presents the results of the litigation probability model based on Rogers and Stocken 
(2005).  The results are similar to those in Rogers and Stocken (2005).  
 
12 It is particularly important to control for firm performance in the tests in order to show that the effects of 
accounting flexibility on management forecasts are not due to firm performance.  
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Consistent with Verrecchia (1990), I expect that firms with more growth opportunities and/or 
information asymmetry are more likely to issue a management forecast.  Based on Lang and 
Lundholm (1993), I include Following, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of I/B/E/S analysts following a firm during the quarter preceding the SEO announcement, as a 
proxy for investors’ demand for information about a firm’s prospects.  I also include a dummy 
variable, Lag_MF, to control for firm-specific factors that may be omitted in the model and the 
stickiness of forecast behavior (Brown et al., 2005).  Based on the findings of Bailey et al. (2003) 
and Heflin et al. (2003) that management forecasts increase after the passage of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure,  I include an indicator variable, Post_FD, that equals one if the calendar quarter in 
which accounting flexibility is measured is the fourth quarter of 2000 or later, and zero otherwise. 
 I also include governance-related variables based on the previous finding that 
management forecasts are associated with the strength of corporate governance, proxied by 
institutional ownership and audit quality (McConomy, 1998; Clarkson, 2000; Ajinkya et al., 
2005; Karamanou et al., 2005;).  Inst_Own is measured as the fraction of common shares held by 
institutional investors at the beginning of the announcement quarter, and Big_N equals one if the 
firm’s auditor is one of the Big-N auditors and zero otherwise. 
 In testing H2 and H3, I include additional controls.  Following Brown et al. (2005), I 
include the inverse Mills ratio, Mills, to control for potential self-selection bias since news 
content and specificity can be measured only for firms issuing management forecasts.  This 
variable is calculated from the probit regression estimating the likelihood of issuing a 
management forecast in the test of H1.  In addition, I include the forecast horizon, Horizon, 
defined as the difference in days between the management forecast date and the end of the fiscal 
period for which the forecast is issued, since the news content and specificity of management 
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forecasts could be related to the timing of the forecasts (e.g., walk-down of market earnings 
expectations in Matsumoto, 2002).  Finally, based on the prior finding that a bad-news forecast is 
less specific so as to dampen the adverse market reaction to upcoming bad news (Hughes and 
Pae, 2004; and Choi et al., 2007), I include an indicator variable, G_News_MF, that equals one 
for a good-news forecast, and zero otherwise.  Following Anilowski et al. (2007), I classify a 
management forecast as good-news or bad-news relative to the prevailing analyst consensus.  
 
3.3 Research Design 
 I employ a matched-control sample approach to test (i) whether the hypothesized effect 
of accounting flexibility on management forecasts is observed both for SEO firms and for non-
SEO firms, and (ii) whether the effect is stronger for SEO firms.  To collect a sample of control 
firms, I identify a non-SEO firm for each SEO firm based on the following criteria.  The matched 
firm (i) must have no equity offerings over a three-year period around the SEO announcement, 
(ii) must belong to the same industry as the SEO firm based on the two-digit SIC code, and (iii) 
is the closest to the SEO firm in market value of equity at the beginning of the SEO 
announcement quarter.  After applying these criteria, I obtain a sample consisting of 480 SEO 
and 480 non-SEO firms from 1997 to 2005.  To distinguish between the two samples, I use an 
indicator variable, SEO, that takes a value of one for SEO firms and zero otherwise.   
 To test H1, I estimate a probit regression model estimating the probability of issuing a 
management forecast using accounting flexibility and other control variables as explanatory 
variables.  The dependent variable MF identifies a firm with a management forecast over the 
nine-month period prior to the SEO announcement.  To examine the relative effect of accounting 
flexibility on the forecast issuance decision of SEO versus non-SEO firms, I include the variable 
Flexibility and an interaction variable, SEO×Flexibility.  All continuous variables are winsorized 
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at the upper and lower one percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers.  The probit model is 
specified as follows (for brevity, I omit the firm subscript). 
  Pr(MF=1) = G (α0 + α1 SEO + α2 Flexibility + α3 SEO×Flexibility + control variables + ε )    (1) 
where G(.) is the cumulative density function of a normal distribution and the control         
variables are explained in Section 3.2.1. 
 I expect α2 to be positive if the managers of non-SEO firms with greater accounting 
flexibility are more likely to issue an earnings forecast.  Furthermore, if the effect of accounting 
flexibility on forecast issuance is greater prior to the SEO, I expect α3 to be positive.  However, 
as stated in H1, if the hypothesized effect of accounting flexibility is observed for SEO firms but 
not for non-SEO firms, I expect (α2 + α3) to be positive and significant but α2 to be insignificant.  
Regarding the control variables, I predict a positive coefficient on Log_MVE, MB, Following, 
Lag_MF, Post_FD, Big_N, and Inst_Own and a negative coefficient on Ind_Con.  I do not have 
a directional prediction for Lit_Prob, Vol_Earn, Sales_Growth, Cum_Ret, and Std_Ret, given the 
mixed prior findings in relation to these variables.   
 To test H2, I estimate a multiple regression of the news content in management forecasts 
(News_MF) on Flexibility and control variables using OLS estimation.  As in the test of H1, in 
addition to Flexibility, the interaction variable SEO×Flexibility is included in the model.               
I include two additional variables to control for the timing of forecasts (Horizon) and self-
selection bias (Mills).  The OLS regression model is specified as follows. 
     News_MF  =  β0 + β1 SEO + β2 Flexibility + β3 SEO×Flexibility + control variables + µ     (2) 
If managers, even in the absence of an equity offering, are likely to issue more optimistic 
forecasts relative to the outstanding analyst consensus when their accounting flexibility is high,   
I expect β2 to be significantly positive.  In addition, if the positive effect of accounting flexibility 
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on the optimism in management forecasts is stronger for SEO firms, then β3 is expected to 
positive.  However, if managers utilize accounting flexibility significantly only prior to SEOs 
when they have a stronger incentive to boost stock prices, I expect (β2 + β3) to be positive and 
significant but β2 to be insignificant.  I expect a positive coefficient on Horizon and negative on 
Log_MVE, Ind_Con, Lit_Prob, Vol_Earn, Following, Post_FD, Big_N and Inst_Own.  
 To test H3, I estimate a multiple regression model of specificity of management forecasts.  
The dependent variable, Specificity_MF, captures the extent to which a management forecast is 
specific.  Besides the control variables that are used in the test of H2, I include an additional 
variable, G_News_MF.  The OLS regression model is specified as follows. 
    Specificity_MF = γ0 + γ1 SEO + γ2 Flexibility + γ3 SEO×Flexibility + control variables + ν  (3) 
As in H1 and H2, γ2 and γ3 are predicted to be positive if a non-SEO manager issues a more 
specific forecast with greater accounting flexibility in order to trigger a greater market reaction to 
their earnings forecast and such positive effect of accounting flexibility is more prevalent for 
SEO firms.  If the positive effect of accounting flexibility on the specificity of management 
forecast is significant only prior to the SEO announcement, I expect (γ2 + γ3) to be positive and 
significant but γ2 to be insignificant.  In the case of control variables, I expect a positive 
coefficient on G_News_MF, Following, Big_N and Inst_Own and a negative coefficient on 
Horizon, Ind_Con, Lit_Prob, and Vol_Earn.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of variables for 480 SEO firms and matched non-
SEO firms.  Several observations are worth noting.  First, SEO and non-SEO firms are similar in 
accounting flexibility; the mean and median Flexibility for SEO firms are -1.09 and 0.01 and 
 20
those for non-SEO firms are -1.37 and -0.06, respectively.  Second, by construction, the two 
groups are similar in size; the mean and median MVE of SEO firms are $1070 million and $345 
million, respectively, while those of non-SEO firms are $969 million and $324 million, 
respectively.  Third, consistent with previous findings that SEOs are undertaken by high growth 
firms and that stock prices run up before the equity offerings (Loughran and Ritter, 1997), the 
mean and median MB and Cum_Ret are higher for SEO firms relative to non-SEO firms.  Fourth, 
SEO firms have higher sales growth (Sales_Growth) and higher volatility of stock returns 
(Std_Ret).  Fifth, relative to non-SEO firms, SEO firms are more likely audited by the Big-N 
auditors (Big_N), while their institutional-holdings are lower (Inst_Own).  Finally, the two 
groups are similar in terms of Lit_Prob, Vol_Earn, and Num_Analysts.  In sum, SEO and non-
SEO firms are similar in terms of several characteristics such as accounting flexibility and size, 
but different in terms of growth and stock return performance.   
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of management forecast attributes of SEO and non-
SEO firms.  Panel A shows the percentage of firms with a management forecast over the two 
nine-month periods, (-18, -10) and (-9, -1), where month 0 is the SEO announcement month.13   
From Panel A, I find that the two groups have a similar tendency to issue forecasts over the two 
nine-month periods.  As suggested by Frankel et al. (1995), the litigation threat around equity 
offerings seems to dampen firms’ incentives to disclose voluntarily just prior to SEOs.  Note, 
however, that the focus of this paper is on the variation within the SEO sample, i.e., I predict that 
the degree of accounting flexibility can influence managers’ forecast behavior prior to SEOs.  
 Panel B through Panel D show two characteristics of management forecasts for SEO and 
non-SEO firms: news content and specificity.  In Panel B, it is observed that SEO firms issue     
                                                 
13 Note that I consider only those forecasts by SEO and non-SEO firms for the reporting period ending after SEO 
announcements for the period, (-9, -1), while I include all of the forecasts issued for the period (-18, -10). 
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good-news forecasts more than non-SEO firms on average, in that around 60% (53%) of 
forecasts issued by SEO firms (non-SEO firms) convey good news.  However, the difference 
between the two groups is not statistically different (p-value = 0.3650).  Panel C shows that 
median News_MF is greater for SEO firms than for non-SEO firms, and the difference is 
marginally significant (p-value = 0.0941).  On the other hand, the means of News_MF for the 
two groups are similar.  Panel D contains summary statistics of specificity.  Consistent with Choi 
et al. (2010), I find that the majority of management forecasts take the form of range estimates in 
the sample: 77% for SEO firms and 69% for non-SEO firms.  Lastly, mean (median) 
Specificity_MF is similar for the two groups: -0.0028 (-0.0015) for SEO firms and -0.0028        
(-0.0013) for non-SEO firms.  Thus, it appears that in general SEO firms and non-SEO firms do 
not differ much in news content and specificity of management forecasts.  However, due to the 
unique tension faced by SEO firms, accounting flexibility may affect the manager’s choice in 
determining these two forecast attributes for SEO firms to a larger extent than for non-SEO firms.  
 
4.2 Results of Hypotheses Tests 
The results of testing H1, H2, and H3 are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 where the           
t-statistics are corrected for clustering of standard errors by year.  Table 4 presents the results for 
H1. As shown in Model 1, while the estimated coefficient on Flexibility is not different from 
zero, the coefficient on (Flexibility + SEO×Flexibility) is significantly positive at the 5% level.  
In addition, the incremental effect of accounting flexibility on SEO firms (i.e., SEO×Flexibility) 
is significantly positive at the 1% level.  These results are consistently obtained even after 
controlling for other variables that influence the forecast issuance decision in Model 2.  In terms 
of economic significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in accounting flexibility is 
associated with an increase in the probability of issuing a management forecast by 5.30% for 
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SEO firms and 0.74% for non-SEO firms.  While this effect for SEO firms is smaller than the 
7.04% increase for a one-standard-deviation increase in Log_MVE, it is much larger than that for 
other continuous explanatory variables.  
The results support H1 that managers of SEO firms with greater accounting flexibility 
have a higher tendency to issue management forecasts prior to the SEO announcement.  Given 
the strong incentive to provide voluntary disclosure to boost the offering proceeds, accounting 
flexibility seems to mitigate legal concerns associated with the disclosure and leads managers to 
issue more forecasts.  However, accounting flexibility appears to have no impact for non-SEO 
firms, possibly due to weaker incentives to boost stock price relative to SEO firms.  In Model 2, 
the coefficient estimates on Log_MVE, Lag_MF, and Post_FD are positive and significant, 
while that on Vol_Earn is negative and significant.  I find insignificant coefficient estimates on 
the rest of the control variables.  
 Table 5 presents the results consistent with H2.  Across the two model specifications, the 
coefficient estimates on SEO×Flexibility and (Flexibility + SEO×Flexibility) are significantly 
positive at the 5% significance level.  These are consistent with H2 that managers of SEO firms 
with greater accounting flexibility provide the market with more optimistic news about future 
earnings.  Again, the insignificant coefficient estimate on Flexibility in Model 2 implies that non-
SEO firms’ managers do not consider their accounting flexibility in providing optimistic 
forecasts to the same extent as the managers of SEO firms.  Regarding control variables, the 
coefficient estimates on Horizon, Ind_Con are significantly positive while those on Lit_Prob and 
MB are significantly negative.   
 The results of tests of H3 are presented in Table 6.  Consistent with H3, the coefficient 
estimates on (Flexibility + SEO×Flexibility) is significantly positive at the 5% significance level 
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with or without the inclusion of other control variables in Models 1 and 2.  Furthermore, the 
incremental effect of accounting flexibility on SEO firms (SEO×Flexibility) is found to be 
positive and (weakly) significant at the 10% level.  The results suggest that in order to trigger 
greater market reaction to their forecasts before equity offerings, managers choose more specific 
forecasts when they have greater accounting flexibility.  I also find that the coefficient estimate 
on Flexibility is positive and significant at the 5% significance level.  Thus, accounting 
flexibility has a positive effect on forecast specificity for non-SEO firms as well, although the 
effect is weaker than that for SEO firms.  From Model 2, I find that the coefficient estimates on 
most of the control variables have the expected sign, while only Horizon and Post_FD have 
significant coefficient estimates.   
 In sum, the empirical results are consistent with all of the three hypotheses.  By 
mitigating the litigation risk relating to disclosures around SEOs, accounting flexibility seems to 
help managers to (i) issue earnings forecasts, (ii) issue more optimistic forecasts relative to the 
prevailing analyst consensus, and (iii) issue more specific forecasts.  Furthermore, the positive 
effect of accounting flexibility is not observed for the control sample of non-SEO firms that have 
weaker incentives for voluntary disclosures to boost stock prices relative to SEO firms.  
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
 I conduct several robustness tests and obtain results consistent with those in the main 
analysis.  First, to mitigate the effect of extreme observations for accounting flexibility, I re-
estimate the three regression models using a decile rank variable instead of a continuous variable.   
Untabulated results show that using a rank variable does not change my main results in that the 
coefficient estimate on (Flexibility + SEO×Flexibility) is significantly positive while that on 
Flexibility is insignificant.  
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Second, I also check the sensitivity of the result of H2 by examining the effect of 
accounting flexibility on good-news versus bad-news forecasts instead of the continuous variable, 
News_MF.  I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of issuing a good-news forecast on 
accounting flexibility and other control variables.  The results indicate that the greater the 
accounting flexibility, the higher the likelihood of issuing a good-news forecast prior to SEOs; 
but such an effect is not observed for non-SEO firms (untabulated).   
 Third, I decompose accounting flexibility into current and non-current components to 
examine whether these two components have differential impact on management forecasts.  This 
test is based on Barton and Simko (2002) who show that the current portion of net operating 
assets has a stronger effect on the firm’s ability to manage earnings than the non-current portion.  
Untabulated results show that the coefficient estimates on the two components of accounting 
flexibility are both significantly positive for SEO firms; for non-SEO firms these coefficient 
estimates are either negative or insignificant.  Furthermore, similar to Barton and Simko (2002), 
I find that the current portion of accounting flexibility has a stronger effect on management 
forecasts of SEO firms than the non-current component. 
 
4.4 Alternative Research Design: Pre-SEO Period versus SEO Period Analysis   
All of the above tests use a matched sample of non-SEO firms as a control group.  If SEO 
firms experience tension between the incentive to provide voluntary disclosures and increased 
litigation threat only before equity offerings, the hypothesized effect of accounting flexibility 
should be observed in that time period alone, and not in other periods.  To test this conjecture, I 
collect data on management forecasts and independent variables for the nine-month period in the 
previous year corresponding to the nine-month period just prior to the SEO announcement.  All 
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of the variables in the previous year, including management forecasts and accounting flexibility, 
are measured either over the period of time or at the point in time corresponding to the SEO 
announcement date.  Thus, by comparing the SEO year with the prior year, I use the firm as its 
own control.  In this analysis, the dummy variable, SEO, takes a value of zero for all 
observations from the year prior to the SEO announcement year.   
 Using 411 SEO firms with available data in both these time periods, I test the three 
hypotheses by comparing the SEO year with the previous year.  From Table 7, the coefficient 
estimates on (Flexibility + SEO×Flexibility) are significantly positive in relation to issuance, 
news content, and specificity of management forecasts, while those on Flexibility are 
insignificant.  Thus, I find a significant effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting 
behavior only for the SEO year consistent with the results reported in the previous section. 
 
4.5 Ex post Validation   
 Given the effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting behavior, I next 
examine whether managers’ forecasting decisions lead to the expected future outcomes based on 
the level of accounting flexibility for earnings management.  Despite the implicit assumption that 
managers of SEO firms can mitigate litigation risk associated with their own forecasts by using 
accounting flexibility, whether accounting flexibility does in fact lead to lower forecast errors is 
an empirical question.  When managers have high accounting flexibility, they first issue 
optimistic forecasts and then reduce forecast errors by managing reported earnings toward their 
forecasts.  On the other hand, when managers have lower accounting flexibility, they first issue 
less optimistic forecasts and then report earnings that are close to the forecasts.  Thus, it is 
possible that the level of accounting flexibility may not be able to differentiate the magnitude of 
forecast errors. 
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 After calculating the management forecast error as the absolute value of the forecast less 
the actual reported earnings, scaled by stock price, I estimate an OLS regression of forecast 
errors on accounting flexibility and other control variables.  In Table 8, the significant negative 
coefficient estimate on (Flexibility + SEO×Flexibility) suggests that accounting flexibility helps 
managers of SEO firms to reduce forecast errors.  In addition, the marginally significant negative 
coefficient on Flexibility indicates that managers of non-SEO firms are also able to reduce their 
forecast errors to some extent when they have accounting flexibility.14  
 
4.6 Effect of Accounting Flexibility on Market Reaction to Management Forecasts   
 I also examine whether the stock market reaction to management forecasts is influenced 
by the firm’s accounting flexibility.  Since the objective of SEO firms is to obtain favorable 
stock valuations by making optimistic forecasts, it is interesting to see if they are successful in 
achieving their objective.  If investors understand the potential for earnings management via the 
firm’s accounting flexibility, they may anticipate the optimism in management forecasts and 
discount the news conveyed by the forecasts.  In unreported results, I find that the market reacts 
to the news in management forecasts issued by both SEO and non-SEO firms, and the difference 
in market reaction for the two samples is insignificant.  Thus, it appears that investors do not 
fully understand the effect of accounting flexibility on the SEO firm’s forecast behavior.   
   
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting 
                                                 
14 Consistent with these results, I find that the accounting flexibility of SEO firms decreases by the end of the fiscal 
period for which the management forecast is issued.  In particular, SEO firms with an optimistic forecast relative to 
the analyst consensus and with subsequent earnings that meet or beat an optimistic forecast experience a greater 
decrease in accounting flexibility (untabulated).  Thus, my evidence suggests that managers make use of accounting 
flexibility to manage earnings announced after the SEO date and hence the remaining accounting flexibility becomes 
lower. 
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behavior prior to SEOs.  I hypothesize that accounting flexibility facilitates management 
forecasts by mitigating the tension faced by SEO firms between a strong incentive to make 
voluntary disclosures to obtain higher stock valuations and an increased level of litigation risk 
due to the regulations associated with public offerings.  The rationale behind this hypothesis is 
that managers with accounting flexibility can manage subsequent reported earnings to meet their 
own forecasts and avoid costly litigation associated with inaccurate forecasts.   
The empirical results show that, before equity offerings, managers with higher 
accounting flexibility are more likely to (i) issue forecasts, (ii) issue forecasts that are more 
optimistic relative to the prevailing analyst consensus, and (iii) issue more specific forecasts.  
Thus, while previous studies suggest that the legal liability exposure around equity offerings 
effectively deters SEO firms’ incentive to disclose additional information prior to an SEO,           
I provide new evidence suggesting that managers can mitigate the threat of litigation if they have 
sufficient ability to manage reported earnings.  Furthermore, this effect of accounting flexibility 
is not observed for firms that are not undertaking an SEO, even though managers in general 
could have reasons other than equity offerings to utilize accounting flexibility in issuing 
management forecasts, such as stock price-based incentives and insider trading incentives. 
Additional ex post analysis provides evidence validating that accounting flexibility does help 
managers to successfully reduce subsequent forecast errors associated with their own forecasts.   
I acknowledge that this study has some limitations.  First, NOA, the measure of 
accounting flexibility I use, may not perfectly capture the construct.  Second, while management 
forecasts are widely used as a parsimonious proxy for voluntary disclosure, I acknowledge that 
they are only a part of the overall disclosure activity.  Thus, it is hard to generalize this paper’s 
results to the overall disclosure behavior of managers.   
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Future research can test the robustness of my results by employing different measures of 
accounting flexibility suggested by previous studies (e.g., “hidden reserves” on the balance sheet, 
and accumulated negative non-operating accruals).  In addition, it is possible to extend the 
current study to settings other than equity offerings where accounting flexibility can influence 
managers’ forecast behavior.  For example, Cheng and Lo (2006) find no significant association 
between good-news forecasts and sale of shares by insiders, most likely because of the higher 
litigation risk faced by insiders.  One could test my hypotheses in this setting, by examining 
whether managers with greater accounting flexibility are more likely to issue good-news 
forecasts when they plan to sell their personal shareholdings. 
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Appendix: Variable Description  
 
1. Management forecasts  
Variable  Definition 
MF = Indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues an earnings forecast for reporting 
periods after the SEO in the nine-month period prior to the announcement date of the SEO 
and zero otherwise  
 
Lag_MF = Lagged value of MF that equals one if the firm issues an earnings forecast in the nine-
month period ending in the tenth month prior to the announcement date of the SEO and 
zero otherwise 
 
News_MF = News contained in management forecasts issued by the firm, measured as management 
forecast minus the prevailing analyst consensus forecast obtained from First Call, divided 
by the stock price on the day before the issuance of the management forecast  
 
G_News_MF = Indicator variable that equals one if the news provided by the management forecast is good 
relative to the prevailing analyst consensus forecast and zero otherwise.  Details of the 
classification can be seen in Anilowski et al. (2007). 
 
Specificity_MF = A continuous variable for the specificity of management forecasts. This variable is set to 
zero for point forecasts, and measured as the negative of the absolute difference between 
the upper limit and lower limit of a range forecast, divided by the stock price on the day 
before the issuance of the management forecast 
 
Horizon = Forecast horizon, measured as the difference in days between the management forecast date 
and the end of the fiscal year (quarter) for which the management forecast is issued  
 
ForErr_MF = Forecast error related to a management forecast, measured as the absolute value of 
management forecast less actual reported earnings, divided by the stock price on the day 
before the issuance of the management forecast  
 
 
2. Financial statement data, stock returns, and analyst data 
Variable  Definition 
NOA  = Net Operating Assets / Sales (#2), where Net Operating Assets equal Operating Assets less 
Operating Liabilities; Operating Assets = Total Assets (#44) - Cash and short-term 
investment (#36); Operating Liabilities = Total Assets (#44) - Debt included in current 
liabilities (#45) - Long-term debt (#51) - Minority interests (#53) - Preferred Stock (#55) - 
Common equity (#59) 
 
Raw_Flexibility  = The negative of NOA, measured at the beginning of the nine-month period prior to the 
announcement of the SEO by using quarterly financial statements  
 
Flexibility = Flexibility measured as the Raw_Flexibility minus the industry median of Raw_Flexibility 
where industry is defined using the two-digit SIC code 
 
R_Flexibility = Decile rank of Flexibility within the sample  
 
MVE = Market value of equity in millions of dollars, measured as the number of shares 
outstanding (#61) times the share price (#14) at the end of the quarter prior to the 
announcement of the SEO 
 
Log_MVE = Firm size measured as a natural logarithm of MVE at the end of the quarter prior to the 
announcement of the SEO 
 
Ind_Con  = Industry sales concentration ratio, measured as the sum of the sales of the top five firms in 
the industry divided by the total industry sales during the quarter prior to the 
announcement of the SEO using the two-digit SIC code 
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Appendix: Variable Description (continued) 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
Lit_Prob  = A measure of the ex ante probability of litigation, calculated as the average of the previous 
three quarters’ probability that the firm will be subject to a class action securities lawsuit 
whose filing date ends during the following calendar quarter. The probability of litigation 
is estimated based on Rogers and Stocken (2005) litigation risk model.  
 
Vol_Earn = Volatility of earnings, measured as the absolute value of the seasonally differenced EPS 
(#19) of the quarter prior to the SEO announcement deflated by the beginning stock price  
 
MB = Market to book ratio, measured as the market value of equity (#61× #14) divided by the 
book value of equity (#59) at the end of the quarter prior to the announcement of the SEO 
 
Sales_Growth  = Growth in sales, measured as the sales for quarter t divided by the sales for quarter t-4 
(minus one). The variable is measured at the end of the quarter prior to the SEO 
announcement. 
 
Cum_Ret = The cumulative returns over a 252-day period ending one day before the announcement of 
the SEO 
 
Std_Ret = The standard deviation of the daily stock return of the firm over a 252-day period ending 
one day before the announcement of the SEO 
 
Following = Analyst following, measured as a natural logarithm of the number of I/B/E/S analysts 
following the firm during the quarter prior to the announcement of the SEO 
 
Post_FD = An indicator variable that equals one if the nine-month-period prior to the announcement 
of the SEO is after 2000 and zero otherwise 
 
Mills = The inverse Mills ratio based on the probit model of issuance of management forecasts 
reported in Table 4.  
 
Big_N = An indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of Big N audit firms, and 
zero otherwise 
 
Inst_Own  = The fraction of the firm’s aggregated common stock held by institutional investors at the 
end of the quarter prior to the announcement of the SEO 
 
WC_NOA = Working Capital / Sales (#2), where Working Capital equals (Current Assets (#40) - Cash 
and short-term investment (#36) ) minus (Current Liabilities (#49) – Debt included in 
current liabilities (#45) ) 
 
WC_Flexibility = Current portion of accounting flexibility, defined as the negative of WC_NOA minus the 
industry median of the negative of WC_NOA, measured at the beginning of the nine-
month period prior to the announcement of the SEO by using quarterly financial statements 
 
NWC_ Flexibility = Non-current portion of accounting flexibility that equals Flexibility minus WC_ Flexibility 
 
CAR = Cumulative abnormal returns over three days surrounding the issuance date of management 
forecasts using value-weighted market returns 
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Table A.1  
Estimation of the probability of litigation  
Prob ( Lawsuit  = 1 )  =  G  (δ0  +  δ1 Log_MVE  +  δ2 Turn  +  δ3 Beta  +  δ4 Returns  +  δ5 Std_Ret +  δ6 Skewness 
                                                    +  δ7 Min_Ret  +   Σ LHigh Risk Industries +  υ ) 
 
Variable Sign Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -4.4184 <.0001 
Log_MVE + 0.1069 <.0001 
Turn + 0.0036 <.0001 
Beta + 0.0220 <.0001 
Returns − -0.1388 <.0001 
STD_Ret + 0.1602 0.7118 
Skewness − -0.0157 0.1487 
Min_Ret − -2.6012 <.0001 
Bio_Tech + -0.0100 0.8238 
Computer Hardware + 0.3022 <.0001 
Electronics + 0.1388 0.0006 
Retailing + 0.0853 0.0586 
Computer Software + 0.2826 <.0001 
    
N  264,032  
N (Lawsuit = 1)  1,119  
Pseudo R2    0.1073   
 
This table presents the result from a probit model of the probability of litigation based on Rogers and Stocken (2005).  The 
sample period ranges from the first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2005.  Lawsuit is an indicator variable that equals one 
if a securities class action lawsuit was recorded by Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse during a 
calendar quarter and zero otherwise.  The following explanatory variables are measured over the calendar quarter.  Log_MVE is 
the natural logarithm of the average market value of equity.  Turn is the average daily trading volume of shares divided by the 
average number of shares outstanding.  Beta is the slope coefficient from the regression of daily returns on the CRSP equal-
weighted index.  Returns is the buy and hold returns over the calendar quarter.  Std_Ret is the standard deviation of daily returns.  
Skewness is the skweness of daily returns.  Min_Ret is the minimum daily return.   
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics of SEOs 
Panel A: Yearly frequency  
Year SEO frequency % of total 
1997   76 15.83 % 
1998   39 8.13 % 
1999   68 14.17 % 
2000   65 13.54 % 
2001   39 8.13 % 
2002   46 9.58 % 
2003   59 12.29 % 
2004   54 11.25 %  
2005   34 7.08 % 
Total  480 100.00 % 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution  
Industry description SIC codes SEO frequency % of total 
Agriculture, mining & construction 7, 13, 15, 16, 17 27 5.63 % 
Food, paper & finished goods  20, 22, 23, 25, 27 18 3.75 % 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 28, 29 68 14.17 % 
Rubber, leather and metal-works 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 19 3.96 % 
Machinery  35 38 7.92 % 
Electronics 36 68 14.17 % 
Other equipment & machinery 37, 38, 39 56 11.67 % 
Transportation 40, 42, 44, 47 20 4.17 % 
Communications  48 9 1.88 % 
Wholesales 50, 51 22 4.58 % 
Retailers 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 33 6.88 % 
Entertainment services 70, 78, 79 13 2.71 % 
Business services 73 54 11.25 % 
Engineering & accounting & management services 87 14 2.92 % 
All others  21 4.38 % 
Total   480 100.00 % 
 
Panel C. Size characteristics  
  Total Assets Market Value Offer Amount Proceeds Size Offer size 
  ($ Millions) ($ Millions) ($ Millions) (%) (%) 
Mean 631.21 1069.95 129.82 26.27 21.06 
Median 190.59 344.96 73.20 21.01 17.86 
Std Dev 1304.51 2573.12 180.13 21.07 12.86 
 
This table displays the summary characteristics of 480 SEOs over the period 1997 to 2005.  Total assets and market value of 
equity are measured at the end of the quarter prior to the announcement of the offering.  Proceeds Size is calculated as the ratio of 
the offer amount to the total market capitalization.  Offer size is measured as the number of shares offered divided by the number 
of shares outstanding prior to the SEO. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of SEO firms and non-SEO firms 
 
 SEO firms (N=480)  Non-SEO firms (N=480) p-valuea p-valueb 
Variables Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD (t-test) (Wilcoxon  Test) 
Flexibility -1.09 0.01 5.36  -1.37 -0.06 5.66 0.4248 0.3624 
MVE 1069.95 344.96 2573.12  969.20 323.97 2274.26 0.5205 0.7377 
Log_MVE 5.98 5.84 1.26  5.94 5.78 1.23 0.6343 0.7377 
Ind_Con (%) 44.79 40.67 14.51  44.79 40.67 14.51 - - 
Lit_Prob (%) 0.47 0.30 0.54  0.50 0.32 0.51 0.3995 0.0573 
Vol_Earn 0.02 0.01 0.05  0.02 0.01 0.06 0.6031 0.7236 
MB 5.29 3.63 5.47  3.79 2.27 4.57 <.0001 <.0001 
Sales_Growth (%) 48.46 23.81 107.89  26.35 8.17 99.07 0.0010 <.0001 
Cum_Ret 1.42 0.81 1.86  0.47 0.15 1.20 <.0001 <.0001 
Std_Ret 0.04 0.04 0.02  0.04 0.04 0.02 0.0004 <.0001 
Inst_Own (%) 41.39 39.51 22.25  49.56 50.52 25.77 <.0001 <.0001 
Big_N 0.93 1.00 0.25  0.89 1.00 0.31 0.0238 - 
Num_Analysts 4.74 3.00 4.69   4.95 3.00 4.91 0.4887 0.7954 
 
This table shows descriptive characteristics of 480 SEO and 480 non-SEO firms over the period 1997 to 2005.  Each SEO firm is 
matched with a firm that (i) has no equity offering over a three-year period around the SEO announcement, (ii) belongs to the 
same 2-digit SIC code as the SEO firm, and (iii) is the closest in market value of equity at the beginning of the announcement 
quarter.  Flexibility is measured as the negative of the industry-adjusted net operating assets divided by sales (NOA), measured at 
the beginning of the nine-month period prior to the announcement of the SEO.  MVE is the market value of equity in millions of 
dollars at the end of the quarter prior to the SEO.  Ind_Con is the industry sales concentration ratio, measured as the sum of the 
sales of the top five firms in the industry divided by the total industry sales during the quarter prior to the SEO.  Lit_Prob is an ex 
ante probability of litigation, calculated as the average of the previous three quarters’ probability that a firm will be subject to a 
class action securities lawsuit based on the litigation risk model in Rogers and Stocken (2005).  Vol_Earn is the volatility of 
earnings, computed as the absolute value of seasonally differed EPS divided by the beginning-quarter stock price.  MB is the 
ratio of market value to book value of equity at the end of the quarter prior to the SEO.  Sales_Growth is measured as the sales of 
quarter t divided by the sales of quarter t-4 (minus one).  Cum_Ret is cumulative returns over a 252-day period ending one day 
before the announcement of the SEO.  Std_Ret is the standard deviation of daily returns over a 252-day period ending one day 
before the announcement of the SEO.  Big_N is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big-N 
auditors and zero otherwise.  Inst_Own is the fraction of common shares held by institutional investors at the beginning of the 
announcement quarter.  Num_Analysts is the number of I/B/E/S analysts covering the firm during the quarter prior to the 
announcement of the SEO.     
 
a  Two-sided p-values of t-tests of difference in means of variables between SEO firms and non-SEO firms 
 
b  Two-sided p-values of non-parametric Wilcoxon tests of difference in distributions of variables between SEO firms and non-
SEO firms  
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of management forecasts of SEO firms and non-SEO firms 
Panel A: Issuance of forecasts  
SEO firms (N=480)  Non-SEO firms  (N=480)  Nine-month  
period  # of firms % of total  # of firms % of total  
p-valuea 
(  -  9 ,     -1 ) 114 23.75  109 22.71  0.7027 
( - 18 ,  - 10 ) 163 33.96  167 34.79  0.7860 
 
Panel B: Good-news forecasts  
SEO firms (N=480)  Non-SEO firms  (N=480)  
 # of  
forecasts 
# of  Good-news  
forecasts 
% of 
total  
# of 
forecasts 
# of  Good-
news forecasts 
% of 
total  
p-valuea 
 99 59 59.60  96 51 53.13  0.3650 
 
Panel C: News content of forecasts  
SEO firms (N=480)  Non-SEO firms  (N=480)  p-valueb 
 # of  
forecasts Mean Median  
# of  
forecasts Mean Median  Mean Median 
News_MF 99 0.0034 0.0008  96 0.0042 0.0003  0.7850 0.0941 
 
Panel D: Specificity of forecasts  
SEO firms (N=480)  Non-SEO firms  (N=480)  
Types of Forecasts 
# of forecasts % of total  # of forecasts % of total  
p-valuea 
Range forecasts 76 76.77  66 68.75  0.2110 
Point forecasts 23 23.23  30 31.25  0.2110 
# of forecasts 99 100.00  96 100.00   
 
SEO firms (N=480)  Non-SEO firms  (N=480)  p-valueb 
 # of 
forecasts Mean Median  
# of 
forecasts Mean Median  Mean Median 
Specificity_MF 99 -0.0028 -0.0015  96 -0.0028 -0.0013  0.9484 0.3389 
 
This table displays the descriptive characteristics of management forecasts issued by 480 SEO and 480 non-SEO firms over the 
period 1997 to 2005.  Panel A shows issuance of management forecasts in the two nine-month periods: (i) from the ninth month 
to one month prior to the SEO, (-9, -1) and (ii) from the 18th month to the 10th month prior to the SEO, (-18, -10).  Panels B and C 
show news content of the last forecast that is issued during the nine-month period, (-9, -1), for reporting periods ending after the 
SEO announcement.  A good-news forecast is a forecast whose news is good relative to the prevailing analyst consensus forecast 
from First Call and zero otherwise, based on Anilowski et al. (2007).  News_MF is the news contained in a management forecast, 
measured as management forecast minus the prevailing analyst consensus forecast divided by the stock price on the day before 
the issuance of the management forecast.  Panel D shows the frequency of forecast types and specificity of the last forecast that is 
issued over the nine-month period, (-9, -1), for the reporting periods ending after the SEO.  Specificity_MF is (i) set to zero for 
point forecasts, and (ii) for range forecasts, computed as the negative of the absolute difference between the upper limit and lower 
limit of the range, divided by the stock price on the day before the issuance of the forecast. 
 
a  Two-sided p-values of t-tests of difference in percentages between SEO firms and non-SEO firms. 
 
b Two-sided p-values of tests of differences in variables between SEO firms and non-SEO firms.  The p-values in the mean 
column are of t-tests of differences in means between the two groups and p-values in the median column are of non-parametric 
Wilcoxon tests of difference in distributions of variables between the two groups. 
 
 39
Table 4 
Effect of accounting flexibility on the issuance of management forecasts  
 
Prob ( MF  = 1 )  =  G ( α0 + α1 SEO + α2 Flexibility + α3 SEO×Flexibility + control variables + ε )      (1) 
 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variable Predicted  Sign Coefficient p-valuea  Coefficient p-valuea 
Intercept  -0.7485 <.0001  -2.9664 <.0001 
SEO + 0.0615 0.4990  0.0715 0.6670 
Flexibility ? 0.0000 0.9990  0.0053 0.4090 
SEO × Flexibility + 0.0423 0.0060  0.0497 0.0450 
Log_MVE +    0.2251 0.0020 
Ind_Con −    0.0987 0.7190 
Lit_Prob + / −    -1.8059 0.8490 
Vol_Earn + / −    -5.1617 <.0001 
MB +    -0.0058 0.6270 
Sales_Growth + / −    0.0551 0.2480 
Cum_Ret + / −    -0.0011 0.9810 
STD_Ret + / −    -0.9554 0.8590 
Following +    0.0145 0.8850 
Lag_MF +    1.0109 <.0001 
Post_FD +    0.8061 <.0001 
Big_N +    0.0201 0.9120 
Inst_Own +    0.1339 0.5940 
       
Flexibility + SEO × Flexibility  + 0.0423 0.0130  0.0550 0.0147 
       
N  960  960 
N (MF=1)  223  223 
Pseudo R2  0.0064  0.2592 
 
This table presents the results of a probit model estimating the probability of issuing a management forecast during the nine-
month period prior to the SEO using Flexibility and other control variables.  SEO is a dummy variable that equals one for SEO 
firms and zero otherwise.  The dependent variable is MF that equals one if a firm has issued at least one forecast for the reporting 
period after the announcement of the SEO during the nine-month period prior to the SEO and zero otherwise.  Other variables are 
defined in the Appendix.   
 
a  p-values relate to t-statistics that are corrected for clustering of standard errors by year 
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Table 5 
Effect of accounting flexibility on the news content of management forecasts 
 
News_MF  =  β0 +  β1 SEO +  β2 Flexibility  +  β3 SEO×Flexibility +  control variables +  µ          (2) 
 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variable Predicted  Sign Coefficient p-valuea  Coefficient p-valuea 
Intercept  0.0047 0.0240  0.0186 0.2860 
SEO + -0.0006 0.8580  0.0009 0.8090 
Flexibility ? 0.0003 0.0640  0.0002 0.2240 
SEO × Flexibility + 0.0051 0.0310  0.0046 0.0130 
Horizon +    0.0024 0.0600 
Mills ?    -0.0053 0.3920 
Log_MVE −    -0.0005 0.8120 
Ind_Con −    0.0181 0.0540 
Lit_Prob −    -0.3981 0.0380 
Vol_Earn −    -0.0204 0.8880 
MB + / −    -0.0014 0.0070 
Following −    -0.0006 0.8250 
Post_FD −    -0.0062 0.2550 
Big_N −    -0.0049 0.4470 
Inst_Own −    -0.0029 0.5810 
       
Flexibility + SEO × Flexibility  + 0.0055 0.0274  0.0048 0.0100 
       
N  195  195 
Adj. R2  0.0217  0.1721 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of news content of management forecasts on Flexibility and other control 
variables.  The regression model is estimated using the last forecast issued during the nine-month period prior to the SEO.  The 
dependent variable is News_MF that is measured as management forecast minus the prevailing analyst consensus forecast 
divided by the stock price on the day before the issuance of the forecast.  Other variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 
a  p-values relate to t-statistics that are corrected for clustering of standard errors by year 
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Table 6 
Effect of accounting flexibility on the specificity of management forecasts  
 
Specificity_MF  =  γ0 +  γ1 SEO +  γ2 Flexibility  +  γ3 SEO×Flexibility +  control variables +  ν       (3) 
 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variable Predicted  Sign Coefficient p-valuea  Coefficient p-valuea 
Intercept  -0.0026 <.0001  0.0076 0.1150 
SEO + -0.0001 0.9110  0.0009 0.2420 
Flexibility ? 0.0001 0.0440  0.0001 0.0400 
SEO × Flexibility + 0.0011 0.0770  0.0008 0.0970 
G_News_MF +    -0.0010 0.0960 
Horizon −    -0.0009 0.0250 
Mills ?    -0.0043 0.0190 
Log_MVE + / −    -0.0004 0.3970 
Ind_Con −    0.0013 0.4310 
Lit_Prob −    0.0072 0.8620 
Vol_Earn −    -0.0596 0.2160 
MB +    0.0000 0.5360 
Following +    0.0003 0.6080 
Post_FD −    -0.0041 <.0001 
Big_N +    0.0003 0.6940 
Inst_Own +    0.0003 0.7850 
       
Flexibility + SEO × Flexibility  + 0.0013 0.0462  0.0010 0.0419 
       
N  195  195 
Adj. R2  0.0674  0.2706 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of specificity of management forecasts on Flexibility and other control variables.  
The regression model is estimated using the last forecast issued during the nine-month period prior to the SEO.  The dependent 
variable is Specificity_MF that is (i) set to zero for point forecasts, and (ii) for range forecasts, computed as the negative of 
absolute difference between the upper limit and lower limit of the range, divided by the stock price on the day before the issuance 
of the forecast.  Other variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 
a  p-values relate to t-statistics that are corrected for clustering of standard errors by year. 
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Table 7 
Comparison of pre-SEO period with SEO period  
 
Predicted  Issuance   News Content  Specificity 
Variable 
Sign Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  -2.0990 <.0001  0.0327 0.1561  -0.0036 0.2614 
SEO + -0.0606 0.6186  0.0005 0.9173  0.0017 0.0072 
Flexibility ? 0.0090 0.6732  0.0011 0.3313  0.0000 0.9918 
SEO × Flexibility + 0.0504 0.1515  0.0037 0.0744  0.0007 0.0094 
          
Control Variables   Included  Included  Included 
          
Flexibility + SEO × Flexibility  + 0.0594 0.0339  0.0048 0.0075  0.0007 0.0026 
          
N  822  159  159 
N (MF=1)  184  −  − 
Pseudo (or Adjusted)  R2  0.1992  0.1589  0.2131 
 
This table presents the results of a probit model estimating the probability of issuing a management forecast during the nine-month period just prior to an SEO relative to 
the corresponding nine-month period in the year prior to the SEO year (columns 3 and 4).   Columns 5 and 6 report results of the OLS regression of news content of 
management forecasts on accounting flexibility,  and columns 7 and 8 report results of the OLS regression of specificity of management forecasts on accounting flexibility.  
SEO is a dummy variable that equals one for observations from the nine-month period just prior to the SEO announcement, and zero otherwise.  Other variables are 
defined in the Appendix.  
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Table 8 
Management forecast errors and accounting flexibility  
 
ForErr_MF  =  θ0 +  θ1 SEO +  θ2 Flexibility  +  θ3 SEO×Flexibility +  control variables +  ζ 
 
Variable Predicted  Sign Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  0.0028 0.7285 
SEO − -0.0044 0.0913 
Flexibility ? -0.0005 0.1618 
SEO × Flexibility − -0.0017 0.1154 
News_MF + / − 0.1797 0.0020 
Horizon + 0.0049 <.0001 
Log_MVE − -0.0007 0.5582 
Ind_Con + / − 0.0128 0.0975 
Lit_Prob + / − 0.2488 0.2649 
Vol_Earn + 0.1825 0.0003 
MB + / − 0.0007 0.0310 
Following − -0.0019 0.4035 
Big_N − 0.0017 0.7091 
Inst_Own − -0.0068 0.2164 
    
Flexibility + SEO × Flexibility  − -0.0022 0.0357 
    
N  195 
Adj. R2  0.2513 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of management forecast errors on Flexibility and other control variables.  SEO 
is a dummy variable that equals one for SEO firms and zero for non-SEO firms.  The regression model is estimated using the last 
forecast issued during the nine-month period prior to the SEO.  The dependent variable is ForErr_MF, measured as the absolute 
value of management forecast less the actual reported earnings divided by the stock price on the day before the issuance of the 
forecast.  Other variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
